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Quantum-inspired secure wireless communication
protocol under spatial and local Gaussian noise
assumptions
Masahito Hayashi Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
Inspired from quantum key distribution, we consider wireless communication between Alice and Bob when the
intermediate space between Alice and Bob is controlled by Eve. That is, our model divides the channel noise into
two parts, the noise generated during the transmission and the noise generated in the detector. Eve is allowed to
control the former, but is not allowed to do the latter. While the latter is assumed to be a Gaussian random variable,
the former is not assumed to be a Gaussian random variable. In this situation, using backward reconciliation and
the random sampling, we propose a protocol to generate secure keys between Alice and Bob under the assumption
that Eve’s detector has a Gaussian noise and Eve is out of Alice’s neighborhood. In our protocol, the security
criteria are quantitatively guaranteed even with finite block-length code based on the evaluation of error of the
estimation of channel.
Index Terms
secret key generation, reverse reconciliation, post selection, noise injection, wireless communication
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, secure wireless communication attracts much attention as a practical method to realize physical
layer security [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. In particular, wire-tap channel
model [14], [15], [16], [17] is considered as a typical model for physical layer security. In the wire-
tap channel model, the authorized sender, Alice is willing to transmit her message to the authorized
receiver, Bob without any information leakage to the adversary, Eve. In this case, we usually assume
that the noise in the channel to Eve is larger than that in the channel to Bob. However, it is not easy to
guarantee this assumption under the real wireless communication. In cryptography, it is usual to consider
that the adversary, Eve is more powerful than the authorized users, Alice and Bob in some sense like
RSA cryptography [18]. However, the above wire-tap channel requires the opposite assumption. So, it
does not necessarily have sufficient powers of conviction to assume the above wire-tap channel in real
wireless communication.
Instead of wire-tap channel model, we often employ secure key agreement, in which, Alice and Bob
generate the agreed secure key from their own correlated random variables [19], [20]. This problem has a
similar problem when they generate secure keys via one-way communication from Alice to Bob, because
they need to assume that the mutual information between Alice and Bob is larger than that between Alice
and Eve. Further, although there exist proposals to generate secure key from wireless communication
[21], [22], [23], [24], [25], they do not give a quantitative security evaluation for the final keys under a
reasonable assumption advantageous to Eve in a finite-length setting.
On the other hand, many people are studying quantum key distribution (QKD)[26], which enables us
to generate secure key without any assumption for Eve’s performance when Alice and Bob are allowed
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to use public channel and they do not detect the existence of Eve. At least, even when Eve has much
powerful performance than Alice and Bob, e.g., the intermediate space between Alice and Bob might
be controlled by Eve, Alice and Bob can generate secure keys. Its security evaluation has been done
even with finite-length including second order analysis [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32]. In QKD, after
the quantum communication from Alice to Bob, Alice and Bob check whether the secure keys can be
distilled from random variables generated by the initial quantum communication via public channel. Also,
Fung [33] et al proposed to use error verification to guarantee the reliability of the final keys for QKD. In
addition, as pointed in several papers [76], [77], [78], when Eve cannot access the noise in Bob’s detector,
information reconciliation with backward can improve the asymptotic key generation rate. In this way,
in the context of QKD, they proposed several advanced methods to generate secure keys after the initial
transmission. However, QKD requires more expensive devices even for Alice and Bob. Hence, it is not so
easy to implement QKD. Therefore, it is required to propose an alternative secure-key generation protocol
of quantum key distribution under a reasonable assumption by using cheaper devices.
In this paper, inspired from these advanced techniques in QKD, we propose a protocol to generate
quantitatively secure keys between Alice and Bob under a reasonable assumption advantageous to Eve
when Alice and Bob do not detect the existence of Eve. In this analysis, Eve is allowed to control the
intermediate space between Alice and Bob, however, she is not allowed to access the noise in Bob’s
detector in a similar way to the analysis in [76], [77], [78]. The biggest difference from the above
analysis in QKD is the assumption that Eve’s detector has non-negligible noise, which cannot be accessed
by Eve. This assumption is stronger than that in QKD, but enables us to generate secure key without use
of quantum communication. Since quantum key distribution assumes public channel, Alice and Bob are
allowed to use public channel in the first step of this paper. However, Eve might override the signals to
Bob or the public channel for spoofing [10]. We explain a method to avoid such attack, which requires
shared secret randomness with small size. Further, for efficient realization of the protocol, we additionally
impose the following requirements.
(R1) The security of final keys is guaranteed quantitatively based on acceptable criterion even for
cryptography community (e.g. the variational distance criterion [35] or the modified mutual
information criterion) even though Eve takes the optimal strategy under the above assumption.
Additionally, the formula to derive the security evaluation has sufficiently small calculation
complexity.
(R2) The calculation complexity of the whole protocol (Protocol 1 given in Section V-A) is sufficiently
small.
This paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we rigorously explain our purpose and our assumption in
Section II. Then, we compare our formulation with existing jamming attacks in Section III-B. As the next
step, before proceeding to our protocol, we discuss the mathematical structure of our model in Section
IV. In Section V, we give our concrete secure protocol by assuming the public channel. In particular, the
end of Subsection V-C2, we briefly explain the solution for spoofing. Section VI analyzes the security of
the given protocol, and numerically evaluates the security in a typical case. Section VII is devoted to two
kinds of extensions, multiple antenna attack and complex number case. Section VIII consider the relation
of a model with interference to the additional noise of the eavesdropper channel so that we clarify how
our model contain such a interference channel. Section IX gives proofs of statements given above.
II. PURPOSE AND ASSUMPTIONS
Recall that the aim of this paper is to propose a protocol to generate quantitatively secure keys between
Alice and Bob under a reasonable assumption advantageous to Eve. Here, our aim is not to always
generate secure keys, but is to detect the existence of eavesdropping with high probability when it exists.
That is, when they consider there is no eavesdropper, their keys are required to be matched and secret.
In other word, it is required to discard their keys when an eavesdropper exists. Here, the case without
eavesdropper means the case when the operation of the eavesdropper cannot be distinguished from the
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natural phenomena. So, the natural case, i.e., the case with the natural phenomena, is very important in
our analysis.
In the real setting, it is difficult to identify where Eve attacks the communication between Alice and
Bob except for Alice’s neighborhood and Bob’s detector. To guarantee the security of the final keys in
such a setting, it is natural to assume the following conditions when Alice sends the i-th signal Ai.
(A1) The intermediate space between Alice and Bob might be controlled by Eve while Eve’s operation
is restricted to satisfy the following conditions. That is, the information Yi can be injected by
Eve as Fig. 1 so that Eve knows the noise Yi+ eB added to Bob’s detection during transmission
in the intermediate space. Here, we choose the variable Yi such that its average is 0. Hence, the
average of the noise is eB . eB is independent of i to due to Assumption (A4).
(A2) When Bob and Eve detect the i-th receiving signal Bi and Ei, independent Gaussian noises bBX1,i
and bEX2,i are added, respectively, where X1,i and X2,i are subject to the stranded Gaussian
distribution and independent of X1,i′ and X2,i′ for i 6= i′. Alice and Bob know the lower bounds
of the powers bB and bE of their noise. This assumption is called the local Gaussian noise
assumption. Since no detector has no detection noise, this assumption is reasonable. Nobody
can control these noises.
(A3) Alice and Bob know the lower bound of the attenuation aE for Alice’s signal in Eve’s detection.
When Eve is out of Alice’s neighborhood, this condition holds. This assumption is called the
spatial assumption for Eve.
(A4) The wireless communication between Alice and Bob is quasi static. That is, the channel between
Alice and Bob is almost constant during a specific time interval so called the coherent time [34,
Section 5.4.1]. In other words, during the coherent time, the noise can be considered to be
independently and identically distributed and to be independent of other variables. Also, the
attenuation aB for Alice’s signal in Bob’s detection. and the attenuation aE for Alice’s signal
in Eve’s detection can be considered to be constants. It means that Eve does not has ability to
change the added nose dependently of the signal transmitted by Alice1. Therefore, the variable
Yi is independent of Ai and the distribution of Yi does not depend on i. Also, the average eB
is independent of i and Ai. We also assume that we can send one block of our protocol during
the coherent time2. In the natural case, the noise in the channel from Alice to Bob is a Gaussian
noise.
(A5) Noiseless public channel between Bob and Alice is assumed. In practice, it can be realized by a
combination of error correcting code and noisy wireless channel between Bob and Alice. This
assumption can be confirmed by authentication as explained in Subsection V-C2.
In summary, when we have m transmissions from Alice to Bob, there is the following relation among
Alice’s i-th sending real variable Ai, Bob’s i-th receiving real variable Bi, and Eve’s i-th receiving real
variable Ei.
Bi := aBAi + Yi + bBX1,i + eB, (1)
Ei := aEAi + bEX2,i + eE . (2)
Here, the coefficients aB, bB , eB, aE , bE , and eE are constants with physical meaning as Table I. To
discuss the situation advantageous to Eve, we assume that Eve’s detection has no noise except for the
noise inside of her detector as Eq. (2). Even though we put eE to be 0, there is no information loss. So,
1This assumption means that the noise added by Eve cannot be adaptively controlled. This assumption is natural because such an adaptive
noise operation requires much advanced technology. In fact, in the early stage of studies of QKD, they assume that the errors is subject to
an identical and independent distribution. The attack under this condition is called the collective attack in the QKD [75]. Hence, it is natural
to assume this kind of assumption at the first paper of our setting.
2In various protocols, a set of pulses or bits treated as one block is called a coding block. The number of such pulses or bits is called
a block length. For example, in RSA cryptography, since the arithmetic is based on the public composite m, logm is a block length. Our
protocol is composed of an error correcting code like an LDPC code. Since the block length of an LDPC code is from 10000 to 100000,
the block length of our protocol is from 10000 to 100000 when we employ a LDPC code.
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we consider only the case when eE is 0 for simplicity. Also, due to Assumption (A1), Eve knows the
value of Y as well as E. Then, additionally we assume the following assumption.
(A6) Eve knows all the channel parameters, which are given in (1) and (2) as well as the value of Yi
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF PARAMETERS. cAB IS COVARIANCE BETWEENA AND B . vB IS VARIANCE OF B . vY IS VARIANCE OF Y . THESE
PARAMETERS ARE KNOWN TO BE EVE.
Coefficient Meaning
Long time Treatment in
Estimation method
period behavior this paper
aB Attenuation Stochastic
To be estimated
cAB
by sampling
aE Attenuation Stochastic
Constant (upper Distance between
bound among Alice and Eve
possible values) (Ass.(A3))
vY
Noise amplitude
Stochastic
To be estimated
vB − c
2
AB − b
2
Bduring transmission by sampling
bB
Bob’s detector
Constant Constant
Performance of Bob’s
noise amplitude detector (Ass.(A2))
bE
Eve’s detector
Constant Constant
Performance of Eve’s
noise amplitude detector (Ass.(A2))

A
Alice
Non-Gaussian
artificial noise
''BY e+
1 'B Bb X e+
Under Eve’s control
2E Eb X e+
Ba A
Ea A
Fig. 1. Eve injects artificial noise to Bob’s observation. eB = e
′
B + e
′′
B .
Since the information Yi can be injected by Eve as Fig. 1, the attack under Assumptions (A1)-(A6) is
called noise injecting attack. When Eve is closer to Alice than Bob and the performance of Eve’s detector
is the same as that of Bob’s, the signal-noise ratio of Eve is not smaller than that of Bob so that secure
communication by one-way wire-tap channel is impossible. We discuss this problem in Section VI-B3.
To overcome this problem, this paper considers two-way protocol like QKD. In the two-way protocol,
the performance depends on the direction of information reconciliation (error correction). When we employ
the forward reconciliation, the performance is the same as the case with one-way wire-tap channel, as
explained in Section VI-B3, then, it cannot realize secure communication in the above case. Our protocol
employs the reverse reconciliation after the above information transmission, as will be given in Section
V.
Here, we discuss the meaning of coefficients aB and aE more deeply. The coefficients aB and aE
express the attenuation. The intensities a2E and a
2
B behave as Cd
−α with positive constants C and α when
the distance from Alice’s transmitting antenna is d, and have stochastic behavior as fading in long time
span[34, Section 5.4.1]. For example, the free space with no obstacle has the constant α = 2[34]. Due to
spatial assumption (Assumption (A3)), Eve’s detector is sufficiently far from Alice’s transmitting antenna.
So, the relation d ≥ d0 holds with a certain constant d0 Under this assumption, we can guarantee that
a2E ≤ Cd−α0 .
On the other hand, the coefficients bB and bE can be lower bounded by the performance of their
detectors due to Assumption (A2). As explain in Section V-A, our protocol contains random sampling.
M. HAYASHI: SECURE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION UNDER SPATIAL AND LOCAL GAUSSIAN NOISE ASSUMPTIONS 5
Hence, the coefficient aB can be estimated as covariance cAB between A and B in the random sampling,
which provides a better estimate than the method based spatial relation between Alice and Bob. Thus, the
meaning of these parameters can be summarized in Table I, while the parameter vY will be introduced in
Section IV. Some of these parameters are estimated from covariance cAB between A and B, variance vB
of B, and variance vY of Y .
III. COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS PAPERS
A. Comparison with other attacks
Most of existing studies for secure wireless communication were done in the context of wire-tap channel.
First, Wyner proposed the model of wire-tap channel [14]. Then, Csisza´r and K’´orner extended the model
to the broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) [15], in which the source node also has a
common message for both receivers in addition to the confidential message for only one receiver. Also,
Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman applied the wire-tap channel to the Gaussian channels [1]. The recent
paper [73, Appendix D-C] showed the strong security in this model. Liang et al extended these analyses
to fading channel [2]. Then, many preceding papers [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12],
[13] studied physical layer security by using wire-tap model. That is, most of studies for physical layer
security in the community of information theory fall in this framework. However, if we adopt wire-tap
model, in order to realize secure communication, we need to assume that the mutual information between
Alice and Bob is greater than the mutual information between Alice and Eve. However, it is usual that
Eve is closer to Alice than Bob. Hence, it is unnatural to assume such a assumption.
In order to remove this strong assumption, we employ a two-way protocol, in which, after receiving
the signal from Alice, Bob sends a modified information to Alice. We make detailed comparison between
our method and the one-way case like the wire-tap channel in Section VI-B3.
In the one-way case, it is sufficient to discuss the relation between the above two types of mutual
information. That is, even when Eve makes various types of attacks, the security analysis are reduced to
the analysis to the two channels, the channel from Alice to Bob and the channel from Alice to Eve. This
characterization holds even when both channels have memory because asymptotic capacity formula was
shown only with the form of these two channels for a general sequence of channels [74]. However, when
we employ a two-way protocol, we need to be careful to the correlation between the added noise in the
channels from Alice to Bob’s and Eve’s signals. Therefore, we compare our model with other attacks in
the next subsection.
B. Comparison with other attacks
Here, we compare our model with the elementary jamming attack [36]. In the elementary jamming
attack, Eve inserts her artificial noise to Bob’s detection. However, she does not know the value of the
added noise. The purpose of jamming attack is to interrupt the communication between Alice and Bob,
and is not to eavesdrop the secret information between Alice and Bob. Hence, in the jamming attack, Eve
makes the artificial noise so large that the error correction by Alice and Bob does not work. That is, the
jamming attack might make their final keys mismatched. Since our protocol contains the the process of
estimation of channel parameters, when Eve makes the elementary jamming attack, Alice and Bob can
detect such a large noise, i.e., the existence of the elementary jamming attack.
In our noise injecting attack model, Eve is allowed to know the value of the added noise. Hence, even
when the artificial noise is as small as the natural case, she might obtain a part of information of the final
keys. Hence, it is difficult for Alice and Bob to find the existence of the noise injecting attack. That is,
Eve in our noise injecting attack model is more powerful than Eve in jamming attack. In such a scenario,
Alice and Bob need to prepare their protocol so that their information transmission is secure against the
most powerful Eve within the scope of their assumption.
Now, we compare our model with channel-hopping jamming attack. In channel-hopping jamming attack,
Eve overrides the signal from Alice to Bob for spoofing [12], [10], [37]. However, such an attack can
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be prevented by the authentication between Alice and Bob. That is, our protocol is secure even against
channel-hopping jamming attack by equipping authentication.
Next, we explain how our assumption covers the case when Eve can change her strategy dynamically.
Alice and Bob can choose the detailed parameter of the secure key distillation protocol (Protocol 2 given
in Section V-A) depending on the coding block because our secure key distillation protocol will be done
as post processing. Assumption (A4) means that Eve cannot change her strategy during the coherent time
interval. That is, she can change her strategy only in the next coherent time interval. Since we estimate
channel parameters for each coherent time interval, our protocol properly reflects such a dynamical change.
In this way, our assumption is more general than existing attacks and covers various types of attacks.
IV. MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURE
A. General case
Before proceeding to our protocol, we discuss the mathematical structure of our model when Alice
independently generates her random variables Ai subject to the standard Gaussian distribution. That is,
we discuss how to simplify Eve’s knowledge for B in this setting. Then, we discuss how to estimate the
distribution of the variable describing Eve’s knowledge for B. For this aim, since the variables Ai, Yi,
X1,i, and X2,i are independent, we consider the single-system description as follows.
B := aBA+ Y + bBX1 + eB, (3)
E := aEA+ bEX2. (4)
In this section, we assume the models (3) and (4), in which the random variables A, X1, and X2 are
independent standard Gaussian random variables and Y is an independent variable with average 0. In
this subsection, we introduce variables E ′, E ′′, Ac, U . When we employ the multiple-system description
like (1) and (2), these variables with i-th transmission are written to be E ′i, E
′′
i , A
c
i , Ui. The variables are
summarized in Table II.
When we discuss the cumulative distribution function of a real valued variable X , we denote it by FX
and treat it. In fact, under the condition Y = y, we denote the cumulant distribution function of X by
FX|Y=y. In the following discussion, Φv expresses the cumulant distribution function of Gaussian variable
with variance v. Firstly, we prepare the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Using the variable
E ′ :=
aBaE
a2E + b
2
E
E + Y, (5)
we have the following relation
PB|(E,Y )=(e,y) = PB|E′=e′, (6)
where e′ = aBaE
a2
E
+b2
E
e + y, and PX|E′=e′ is the conditional distribution for X when E ′ is e′. Also, PB|E′=e′
is the Gaussian distribution with average e′ + eB and variance vB|E′ :=
a2
B
b2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+ b2B .
This theorem implies that the noise injecting attack can be reduced to the attack only with the random
variable E ′.
Proof. We introduce the random variable
U := bEA− aEX2, (7)
which is a Gaussian random variable independent of Y and X1. Also, since the covariance between U
and E is zero, U is independent of E. The variance of U is b2E + a
2
E . Since A =
aE
a2
E
+b2
E
E + bE
a2
E
+b2
E
U , we
have
B = aBA+ Y + bBX1 + eB =
aBaE
a2E + b
2
E
E + Y +
aBbE
a2E + b
2
E
U + bBX1 + eB. (8)
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Since aBbE
a2
E
+b2
E
U + bBX1 is a Gaussian random variable with variance
a2Bb
2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+ b2B and is independent of E
and Y , we have
FB|(E,Y )=(e,y)(
aBaE
a2E + b
2
E
e + y + t+ eB) = Φ a2
B
b2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+b2
B
(t) = FB|E′=e′(e′ + t+ eB), (9)
which implies the desired statement.
To evaluate the amount of the information leaked to Eve, we need to estimate the distribution PE′ of the
random variable E ′ from the variables A and B accessible to Alice and Bob. For this aim, we introduce
the random variable
Ac := Y + bBX1 = B − aBA− eB, (10)
which is the total noise in B and can be directly estimated by Alice and Bob in the protocol given in
Section V. That is, we discuss how to derive the distribution PE′ from the distribution PAc of A
c. For this
discussion, we employ the convolution F1 ∗ F2 for given two distribution functions F1 and F2, which is
defined F1 ∗F2 as F1 ∗ F2(x) := dF1dx (x− y)F2(y)dy when F1 is differentiable. When F2 is differentiable,
the convolution F1 ∗F2 is defined as F2 ∗F1. In particular, we utilize Gaussian convolution Gv defined as
Gv[F ] := Φv ∗ F. (11)
Since Y is independent of other variables, the distributions of PAc and PE′ of A
c and E ′ are given as
FAc = Gb2
B
[FY ], FE′ = G a2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
[FY ]. (12)
When
a2Ba
2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
≥ b2B , we can estimate the distribution PE′ by applying the Gaussian convolution to the
distribution PAc as
FE′ = G a2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
[FAc ]. (13)
However, when
a2Ba
2
E
a2E + b
2
E
< b2B, (14)
we cannot apply this method. Indeed, we can estimate the distribution PE′ by applying the Gaussian
deconvolution, which is the inverse operation of the Gaussian convolution (11). But, it is quite difficult
to estimate the amount of the error of our estimate of the distribution PE′ when we employ the Gaussian
deconvolution. Since our evaluation of the amount of leaked information requires the evaluation of the
amount of error in the estimation of the distribution, we employ the distribution PAc instead of the
distribution PE′ as follows. In this case, we introduce two independent standard Gaussian random variables
Z1 and Z2 instead of X1 such that
√
b2B − a
2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
Z1+
aBaE√
a2
E
+b2
E
Z2 = bBX1. Hence, instead of (8), we have
B =
aBaE
a2E + b
2
E
E + Y +
√
b2B −
a2Ba
2
E
a2E + b
2
E
Z1 +
aBbE
a2E + b
2
E
U +
aBaE√
a2E + b
2
E
Z2 + eB. (15)
Since aBaE
a2
E
+b2
E
E +
√
b2B − a
2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
Z1 is a Gaussian variable with variance b
2
B and is independent of Y , the
variable
E ′′ :=
aBaE
a2E + b
2
E
E + Y +
√
b2B −
a2Ba
2
E
a2E + b
2
E
Z1 (16)
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satisfies FE′′ = Gb2
B
[PY ] = FAc . Fortunately, it is sufficient to know the cumulative distribution function
FE′′ in this case instead of FE′ because E
′′ is more informative with respect to B than E ′ due to the
Markovian chain
E ′ −◦−E ′′ −◦−B, (17)
which follows from (15). In fact, when Eve knows the random variable Z1 as well as the random variables
E and Y , E ′′ can be considered as Eve’s knowledge with respect to B due to the following corollary of
Theorem 1.
Corollary 2: Assume (14). (Otherwise, we cannot define the variable E ′′.) Then, we have the Markovian
chain E ′ −◦− E ′′ −◦− B and
PB|(E,Y,Z1)=(e,y,z1) = PB|E′′=e′′, (18)
where e′′ := aBaE
a2
E
+b2
E
e + y +
√
b2B − a
2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
z1. Also, PB|E′′=e′′ is the Gaussian distribution with average
e′′ + eB and variance a2B .
Proof. We use the same notations as Theorem 1. Since aBbE
a2
E
+b2
E
U + aBaE√
a2
E
+b2
E
Z2 is a Gaussian random
variable with the variance a2B and is independent of E, Y , and Z1, (15) implies that
FB|(E,Y,Z1)=(e,y,z1)(
aBaE
a2E + b
2
E
e+ y +
√
b2B −
a2Ba
2
E
a2E + b
2
E
z1 + t + eB) = Φa2
B
(t) = FB|E′′=e′′(e
′′ + t+ eB),
(19)
which implies all the desired statements.
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF RANDOM VARIABLES.
Variable Meaning
Gaussian/
Equation No. Variance
Non-Gaussian
A
Alice’s sending
Gaussian (3), (4) 1
variable
B
Bob’s receiving
Non-Gaussian (3) a2B + vY + b
2
Bvariable
E
Eve’s receiving
Gaussian (4) a2E + b
2
Evariable
Y
Eve’s receiving
Non-Gaussian (3) vY
variable
bBX1
Bob’s detector
Gaussian (3) b2Bnoise
bEX2
Eve’s detector
Gaussian (4) b2Enoise
E
′ Eve’s information Non-Gaussian (5) a
2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+ vYin B
E
′′ Eve’s information Non-Gaussian (16) b2B + vYin B in case (14)
A
c Total noise Non-Gaussian (10) vY + b
2
Bin B
U
Gaussian variable
Gaussian (7) b2E + a
2
Eindependent of E
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B. Gaussian case
Now, as a typical case, we assume that Y is also a Gaussian random variable with variance vY while
we do not assume this assumption except for this subsection. In this case, the possibility of secure key
generation can be discussed by comparison of the correlation coefficient ρA between B and A and the
correlation coefficient ρE between B and E. That is, when ρ
2
E < ρ
2
A, we can distill secure keys from A
and B with backward reconciliation. By using variance vY of Y , the former correlation coefficient ρA is
calculated as
ρ2A =
a2B
a2B + vY + b
2
B
. (20)
Since the variance of E ′ is a
2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+ b2B and the covariance between E
′ and B is a
2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+ b2B , by using
covariance cAB between A and B and variance vB of B, the correlation coefficient ρE′ between E
′ and
B can be calculated as
ρ2E′ =
1
a2B + vY + b
2
B
( a2Ba2E
a2E + b
2
E
+ vY
)
=
1
vB
( c2ABa2E
a2E + b
2
E
+ vB − c2AB − b2B
)
=1− c
2
AB
vB
+
1
vB
( c2ABa2E
a2E + b
2
E
− b2B
)
. (21)
When we find that the distribution PE′ is sufficiently close to the Gaussian distribution, the security
can be approximately evaluated by the above formula. That is, the comparison between (20) and (21)
clarifies whether secure keys can be distilled. Now, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3: The inequality ρ2E′ < ρ
2
A holds if and only if
a2B
vY
>
a2E
b2E
+ 1
(
i.e., vY <
a2Bb
2
E
a2E + b
2
E
)
. (22)
Proof. The condition 1
a2
B
+vY +b
2
B
(
a2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+ vY ) <
a2
B
a2
B
+vY +b
2
B
is equivalent to 0 < a2B − ( a
2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+ vY ) =
a2
B
b2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
− vY = a2B( b
2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
− vY
a2
B
). This condition is equivalent to 1 +
a2
E
b2
E
=
a2
E
+b2
E
b2
E
<
a2
B
vY
. So, we obtain
Lemma 3.
Instead of (21), we calculate the correlation coefficient ρE′′ between E
′′ and B can be calculated as
follows. Since the variance of E ′′ is vY + b2B and the covariance between E
′′ and B is vY + b2B , the
correlation coefficient ρE′′ between E
′′ and B can be calculated as
ρ2E′′ =
1
a2B + vY + b
2
B
(vY + b
2
B)
=
1
vB
(vB − c2AB)
=1− c
2
AB
vB
. (23)
V. PROTOCOL
A. Description of protocol
The whole protocol for noise injecting attack is given as Protocol 1, which runs Protocol 2 (backward
secure key distillation protocol) as a subprotocol. Before Protocol 2, we discuss secure key distillation
protocols. Although there exist several methods to asymptotically attain the optimal one way key distillation
M. HAYASHI: SECURE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION UNDER SPATIAL AND LOCAL GAUSSIAN NOISE ASSUMPTIONS 10
Protocol 1 Whole protocol
Before the protocol, Alice and Bob need to know the values of bB , bE , and aE based on Assumptions
(A2) and (A3). In the following steps, Alice and Bob are allowed to use the noiseless public channel.
(The common choices in the following steps can be done as follows. For example, Alice randomly
decides the choices of the sample data, and she sends the information with respect to these choices
to Bob via the noiseless public channel. Also, they exchange common chosen samples data via the
noiseless public channel.)
STEP 1: [Initial key transmission] Alice generates her n+2l variables A1, . . . , An+2l according to standard
Gaussian distribution independently, and she sends them to Bob by using the given channel n+2l times.
STEP 2: [Estimation 1] After initial communication, Alice and Bob randomly choose common l samples
data (A¯1, B¯1), . . . , (A¯l, B¯l) from (A1, B1), . . . , (An+2l, Bn+2l). They obtain the estimates eˆB, vˆB , and
cˆAB of the average of B, the variance of B and the covariance of A and B by using the average, the
unbiased variance, and the unbiased covariance of the common l samples data, respectively.
STEP 3: [Estimation 2] Alice and Bob randomly choose another l common samples data
(A˜1, B˜1), . . . , (A˜l, B˜l) from the remaining n + l data. Based on eˆB , vˆB , and cˆAB , they obtain the
estimates PˆAc and PˆE′ of the distributions PAc and PE′ when
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
≥ b2B . Otherwise, they obtain only
the estimate PˆAc of the distribution PAc , which works as the estimate PˆE′′ of PE′′ as well. Here, they
redefine the random variables E ′ := E ′ + eB − eˆB and E ′′ := E ′′ + eB − eˆB.
STEP 4: [Secure key distillation] Based on the above estimates, Alice and Bob apply the backward
secure key distillation protocol for n data, which will be explained as Protocol 2. For Protocol 2, they
redefine (A1, B1), . . . , (An, Bn) as the remaining n pairs of Alice’s and Bob’s variables.
rate from Gaussian random variables by using suitable discretization [42], [43], [44], [45], there is no
protocol to distill secure keys from Gaussian random variables satisfying the following conditions3.
(B1) The whole calculation complexity is not so large.
(B2) A security evaluation of the final key is available with finite block-length.
Since the difficulty of its efficient construction is caused by the continuity, we employ very simple
discretization in our protocol. Before describing the secure key distillation protocol, we prepare notations
for hash functions. We consider a randomized function fH from F
n1
2 to F
n2
2 , where H is the random
variable identifying the function fH , and m1 := n1 − n2 and n2 are called the sacrifice bit length and
the output length, respectively. Alice and Bob need to prepare random seeds H to identity the function
fH . The seeds H is allowed to be leaked to Eve. A randomized function fH is called a universal2 hash
function when the collision probability satisfies the inequality
Pr{fH(c) = fH(c′)} ≤ 2n2−n1 (24)
for any distinct elements c 6= c′ ∈ Fn12 [46], [47]. In the above equation, Pr expresses the probability with
respect to the choice of H . Under these preparations, we give our protocol satisfying the above conditions
(B1) and (B2) as Protocol 2. Notice that the choice of the sacrifice bit length m1 given in (65) ((66))
does not assume that Y is Gaussian.
Finally, we discuss the effects of the stochastic behaviors of the coefficients aB and aE due to fading.
Even though this condition does not necessarily hold even in the average case with respect to this stochastic
behavior, Alice and Bob might be able to efficiently generate secure keys. In this case, Alice and Bob need
to assign aE to the maximum value among possible values. On the other hand, by random sampling, they
can observe whether each coding block can generate secure keys. Hence, there might be a possibility that a
part of coding blocks can generate secure keys. That is, they can apply the backward secure key distillation
3To satisfy these two requirements, our analysis is needed to be simple. For this aim, the random variable A is needed to be subject to
the Gaussian distribution. This property of A allows us to simply describe Eve’s information to be E′ as shown in Theorem 1.
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Protocol 2 Backward secure key distillation protocol for n data
Before stating the following steps, Alice and Bob prepare the estimates PˆE′ (or PˆE′′), PˆAc , eˆB , and cˆAB.
In the following steps, all communications between Alice and Bob are done via the noiseless public
channel.
STEP 1: [Discretization] Bob converts his random variable Bi − eˆB to 1 or 0 by taking its sign, i.e., he
obtains the new bit random variable B′i in F2 as (−1)B′i = sgn(Bi− eˆB). B′n is defined as (B′1, . . . , B′n).
STEP 2: [Information reconciliation] Based on the capacity I[PˆAc , cˆAB] of the channel WA|B′:
WA|0(a) :=
1√
2π
e−
a2
2
∫∞
0
PˆAc(b− cˆABa)db∫∞
−∞
1√
2π
e−
a′2
2
∫∞
0
PˆAc(b′ − cˆABa′)db′da′
WA|1(a) :=
1√
2π
e−
a2
2
∫ 0
−∞ PˆAc(b− cˆABa)db∫∞
−∞
1√
2π
e−
a′2
2
∫ 0
−∞ PˆAc(b
′ − cˆABa′)db′da′
,
Alice and Bob prepare an error correcting code C ⊂ Fn2 , whose choice will be explained in Subsection
V-B. Bob computes the syndrome as an element [B′n] of the coset space Fn2/C from his bit sequence
B′n, calculate its representative element α([B′n]) in Fn2 , and sends α([B
′n]) to Alice. Bob calculates
B′n−α([B′n]) ∈ C. Alice applies the error correction to the data ((−1)α([B′n])iAi)ni=1 so that she obtains
the estimate of B′n − α([B′n]) ∈ C. Here, the error correction is based on the channel {WZ|0,WZ|1}.
STEP 3: [Privacy amplification] Based on PˆE′ or PˆE′′ in addition to eˆB and cˆAB , Alice and Bob decide
the sacrifice bit length m1, whose choice will be given in (65) or (66). Then, they apply universal2 hash
function to their bits in C with sacrifice bit length m1. They obtain the keys K with length dimC−m1.
Here, Alice (or Bob) generates the random seeds locally and can send it to Bob (or Alice) via public
channel.
STEP 4: [Error verification] Alice and Bob choose the bit length m2 for error verification, whose choice
will be discussed in Subsection V-C2. They apply another universal2 hash function to the keys with
output length m2. They exchange their output of the universal2 hash function. If they are the same,
discarding their final m2 bits from their keys, they obtain their final keys. If they are different, they
discard their keys.
protocol only to the coding blocks that can generate secure keys. Such a selection of advantageous events
to Alice and Bob is called post selection.
B. Choice of code and its calculation complexity
Now, we discuss the calculation complexity of our protocol. In Protocol 1 except for Protocol 2, we
calculate only the averages of the obtained data and its square. So, their calculation complexity is not so
large. Protocol 2 contains the calculation of syndrome, the decoding of the given error correction code,
and universal2 hash function. For Information reconciliation, we need to choose a suitable code, e.g.
LDPC codes to satisfy the following condition.
(C1) The calculation of syndrome and the decoding of the given error correction code are have been
already implemented with reasonable calculation complexity. In fact, so many codes satisfy this
condition [62, p. 228].
(C2) The code can decode the message under the channel WA|B, which is given in the Protocol 2.
If we use such a code, we can exploit existing algorithms for Step of Information reconciliation.
To achieve a larger key generation rate, we need to choose an error correction code C ⊂ Fn2 whose
coding rate is close to the capacity. For this purpose, we employ an LPDC code with the brief propagation
method, whose block length is around 216 ∼= 65, 000[62, Chap. 4]. However, we do not necessarily choose
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the block length of the error correcting code to be the block length n of our protocol. That is, we can
consider the concatenation of our error correcting code. When the block length of our error correcting
code is n
k
, k blocks of our error correcting code is treated as one block of our of our protocol, i.e.,
we apply one hash function to k blocks of corrected keys of error correction. That is, our LDPC code
C ⊂ Fn/k2 is chosen so that the dimension is less than nk I[PˆAc , cˆAB]. Since the agreement between Alice
and Bob can be checked by error correction, we do not need to evaluate the error of estimation PˆAc . That
is, to decide the block length n of our protocol, we need to care about only the calculation complexity
of hash function.
C. Privacy amplification, verification, and their calculation complexity
1) Privacy amplification: For Privacy amplification, we can use a modified Toeplitz matrix as a typical
example of a universal2 hash function, whose detail construction and evaluation of the complexity of its
construction are summarized in the recent paper [48, Appendix]. Its calculation complexity is O(m logm)
when m is the input length. Indeed, it was reported in paper [48] that the above type hash function
practically implemented with m = 1000000 by a conventional personal computer. So, the part of privacy
amplification has only calculation complexity O(n logn).
Here, we need to calculate the size of the sacrifice bit length in privacy amplification. This length
should be chosen so that the security criterion (32) or/and (33) is less than a given threshold, which
shows the security level. This calculation can be done by using the formulas (34) or/and (35) in Lemma
5, whose calculation complexity does not depend on the numbers of input and output lengths, as explained
in Subsection VI. So, this process also can be done efficiently.
2) Verification of correctness and public channel: The error verification is also done by a universal2
hash function. When we employ the above example, it has only calculation complexity O(m2 logm2). Due
to this step, we can guarantee the correctness with probability 1− 2−m2 , which is called the significance
level[33, Section VIII]. So, it is enough to choose m2 depending on the required significance level. Hence,
we do not need to evaluate the decoding error probability for the step of information reconciliation. That
is, we do not need to care about the estimation error in the step of information reconciliation. In contrast,
we need to be careful for the estimation error in the step of privacy amplification because no method can
evaluate the amount of information leaked to Eve in the final keys without use of the estimation error.
Rigorously, in this protocol, Eve might override the signals to Bob or the public channel for spoofing
[12], [10]. To avoid Eve’s spoofing, Alice and Bob needs verification of their public channel, i.e., they
need to authenticate each other [46], [47], [49], [50]. Alice and Bob can authenticate each other by
using universal2 hash function. This authentication consumes a small number of secret keys between
Alice and Bob. Since the length of the keys for the authentication is smaller than the length of generated
keys, Alice and Bob can increase the length of the secret keys efficiently. When we consume k bits for
the authentication for n-bit transmission, the authentication scheme is secure with a failure probability
of n2−k+1 [49, Theorem 9]. So, If Alice and/or Bob find disagreement, they consider that there exists
spoofing and discard the obtained random variable. Then, this protocol well works totally.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND SACRIFICE BIT LENGTH
A. Finite-length case with known parameters and distribution
We analyze the security when the distribution of PY and the parameters aB , aE , vY , bB , bE and eB
are known to Alice and Bob. Since Eve knows the exchanged information via public communication, she
knows eˆB, i.e., she knows eB − eˆB .
1) Single-system description: First, we discuss this problem with the single-system description, in
which B′ is defined as B′ := sgn(B − eˆB). So, due to a similar analysis to Theorem 1, Eve’s knowledge
for Bob’s random variable B − eˆB = E ′ + aBbEa2
E
+b2
E
U + bBX1 + eB − eˆB can be reduced to E ′ because E ′
is independent of aBbE
a2
E
+b2
E
U + bBX1.
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In this section, we derive general security formulas by using the true probability density function PE′
of the random variable E ′. For this purpose, we introduce the functions H [PE′, v] and φ[PE′, v](t) as
H [PE′, v]
:=−
∫ ∞
−∞
[
Φ1(
x√
v
) log Φ1(
x√
v
)dx
+ (1− Φ1( x√
v
)) log(1− Φ1( x√
v
))
]
PE′(x)dx, (25)
and
φ[PE′, v](t)
:= log
∫ ∞
−∞
(Φ(
x√
v
)
1
1−t + (1− Φ( x√
v
))
1
1−t )1−tPE′(x)dx, (26)
where the base of the logarithm is chosen to be 2 in this paper.
Using the parameter v, we introduce the joint probability density function PB′,E′ of the random variables
B′ and E ′ as
PB′,E′(0, x) = Φ1(
x√
v
)PE′(x), PB′,E′(1, x) = (1− Φ1( x√
v
))PE′(x). (27)
So, the functions H [PE′, v] and φ[PE′, v](t) are rewritten as
H [PE′, v] = H(B
′|E ′)[PB′,E′] (28)
φ[PE′, v] = φ(B
′|E ′)[PB′,E′], (29)
where
H(B′|E ′)[PB′,E′]
:=
∫ ∞
−∞
PB′,E′(0, x) log
PB′,E′(0, x) + PB′,E′(1, x)
PB′,E′(0, x)
dx
+
∫ ∞
−∞
PB′,E′(1, x) log
PB′,E′(0, x) + PB′,E′(1, x)
PB′,E′(1, x)
dx, (30)
φ(B′|E ′)[PB′,E′](t)
:= log
∫ ∞
−∞
(PB′,E′(0, x)
1
1−t + PB′,E′(1, x)
1
1−t )1−tdx. (31)
Here, this definition can be applied to a general pair of a binary variable B′ and a real variable E ′. Notice
that we have − d
ds
φ[PE′, v](s)|s=0 = H [PE′, v]. Using the property of this type of information quantity
given in [57], we have the following properties for the function φ[PE′, v](t).
Lemma 4: The function φ[PE′, v](t) is convex for t ∈ (0, 1).
This lemma is shown in Subsection IX-A. Since the limit limt→0
−φ[PE′ ,v](t)
t
equals the conditional entropy,
H [PE′, v] is monotone decreasing for ρ.
2) Multiple-system description: To evaluate the security, we discuss the multiple-system description, in
which the variables Ei, E
′
i, E
′′
i , A
c
i , Ui are defined in the same way as Ai and Bi. All of Eve’s knowledge
is written as E . As shown below, in the privacy amplification, we need to choose the sacrifice but rate m1
n
is larger than 1−H [PE′, vB|E′], where n is the block length before information reconciliation and vB|E′
was defined to be the variance
a2Bb
2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+b2B . To show this fact, we make more precise analysis on the leaked
information as follows. Using the relative entropy D(P‖Q) := ∑x P (x)(logP (x) − logQ(x)) and the
variational distance d(P,Q) :=
∑
x |P (x)−Q(x)|, we adopt the conditional modified mutual information
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I ′(K : E|H) [51], [40] between Bob and Eve and the variational distance measure d(K : E|H) [52]
conditioned with H as
I ′(K : E|H) :=
∑
h
PH(h)D(PEK|H=h‖PE|H=h × PUni,K) (32)
d(K : E|H) :=
∑
h
PH(h)d(PEK|H=h, PE|H=h × PUni,K), (33)
where PUni,K is the uniform distribution for the final key. It is known that the latter satisfies the universal
composable property [35]. Remember hat H is the random variable to describe the choice of hash function.
Here, we give security formulas with true parameters. So, the discussions in [38], [39], [40], [41] yield
the following lemma, whose detail derivations are available in Subsection IX-A.
Lemma 5: We have
I ′(K : E|H) ≤ inf
s∈(0,1)
1
s
2s(n−m1)+nφ[PE′ ,vB|E′ ](s), (34)
d(K : E|H) ≤3 min
t∈[0, 1
2
]
2t(n−m1)+nφ[PE′ ,vB|E′ ](t). (35)
Since the function t 7→ (n−m1)+nφ[PE′, vB|E′](t) is convex (Lemma 4), the minimum mint∈[0, 1
2
] t(n−
m1)+nφ[PE′, vB|E′](t) is computable by the bisection method [53, Algorithm 4.1], which gives the RHS
of (35). Since s 7→ − log s is convex, the function s 7→ (s(n−m1) +nφ[PE′, vB|E′](s))− log s is convex.
So, the infimum inft∈(0,1) t(n−m1) + nφ[PE′, vB|E′](t) is computable in the same way. That is, we can
calculate the RHS of (34) in Lemma 5. When the sacrifice bit length m1
n
is greater than 1−H [PE′, vB|E′],
there exists s ∈ (0, 1
2
] such that (s(1 − m1
n
) + φ[PE′, vB|E′](s)) < 0. So, both upper bounds go to zero
exponentially for n.
Our condition for the random hash function fH can be relaxed to ǫ-almost universal dual hash function
[54]. ([40] contains its survey with non-quantum terminology.) The latter class allows more efficient
random hash functions with less random seeds [48]. Even when the random seeds H is not uniform
random number, we have similar evaluations by attaching the discussion in [48]. While it is possible to
apply left over hashing lemma [55], [56] and smoothing to the min entropy [52], our evaluation is better
than such a combination even in the asymptotic limit, as is discussed in [38], [40].
B. Asymptotic case
1) Asymptotic case with known parameters and distribution: Next, from the theoretical viewpoint, we
discuss the asymptotically achievable rate when the distribution of PY and the parameters aB , aE , vY ,
bB , bE , and eB are known to Alice and Bob. For simplicity, we consider the case when the information
reconciliation asymptotically generates agreed keys between Alice and Bob with the mutual information
rate I(B′;A) = 1−H(B′|A)[PB′,A]. Since our focus in this section is limited to the asymptotic analysis
with independent and identical distributed setting, it is sufficient to discuss the single-system description as
Subsection VI-A1. The analysis in Section VI-A guarantees that the rate 1−H [PE′, vB|E′] is asymptotically
sufficient for the rate of of sacrificed keys. Hence, the above method yields the asymptotic key generation
rate (1 −H(B′|A)[PB′,A] − (1 −H [PE′, vB|E′]))+ = (H [PE′, vB|E′] −H(B′|A)[PB′,A])+, where (x)+ :=
max(x, 0). Using the existing results of secure key generation [71], [72], [51], we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 6: (i) When there exists a cumulative distribution function F such that the distribution
corresponding to F is not the delta measure and
Φ a2
B
b2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
= FY ∗ F, (36)
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we have H [PE′, vB|E′] − H(B′|A)[PB′,A] > 0, and there is no protocol to generate secure keys be-
tween Alice and Bob from the sequence of B′ and A whose asymptotic key generation is greater than
H [PE′, vB|E′]−H(B′|A)[PB′,A].
(ii) Conversely, when there exists a cumulative distribution function F such that
FY = Φ a2
B
b2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
∗ F, (37)
Alice and Bob cannot distill secure key from A and B′.
Proof. First, we show (i). As mentioned in the previous section, Eve’s information for B − eˆB is
summarized to E ′. Let V1 be a random variable such that the cumulative distribution function is F
and it is independent of E ′. Condition (36) guarantees
F ∗ FE′ = F ∗ (Φ a2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
∗ FY ) = Φ a2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
∗ (F ∗ FY ) = Φ a2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
∗ Φ a2
B
b2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
= Φa2
B
,
which implies that the variable E ′ + V1 is subject to the same distribution as aBA. Let V2 be a random
variable independent of E ′ and V1 that is subject to the same distribution as Y + bBX1. Then, the joint
distribution PE′+V1,E′+V1+V2 between E
′+V1 and E ′+V1+V2 is the same as the joint distribution PaBA,B
between aBA and B. Similarly, the joint distribution PE′,E′+V1+V2 between E
′ and E ′ + V1 + V2 is the
same as the joint distribution PE′,B between E
′ and B. Thus, we stochastically have the Markovian chain
E ′−◦ A−◦ B−◦ B′ . Hence, we have I(B′;A|E ′) =∑e′ PE′(e′)(H(sgn(e′+V1+V2− eˆB))−∫∞−∞H(sgn(e′+
v1+V2− eˆB))PV1(dv1)). Since the variable V2 takes values from −∞ to∞ with non-zero probability, and
PV1 is not a delta measure, we have H(sgn(e
′+V1+V2−eˆB))−
∫∞
−∞H(sgn(e
′+v1+V2−eˆB))PV1(dv1) > 0
for any real number e′, which implies that I(B′;A|E ′) > 0. Therefore, the optimal key generation rate is
calculated as [71], [72], [51]
0 < I(B′;A|E ′) = I(B′;A)− I(B′;E ′) = H [PE′, vB|E′]−H(B′|A)[PB′,A]. (38)
Next, we show (ii). When (37) holds, we have
F ∗ Φa2
B
= (F ∗ Φ a2
B
b2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
) ∗ Φ a2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
= FY ∗ Φ a2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
= FE′.
Let V3 be a random variable such that the cumulative distribution function is F and it is independent of
aBA. Let V4 be a random variable independent of aBA and V3 that is subject to the Gaussian distribution
with average 0 and variance
a2
B
b2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+b2B . Then, the joint distribution PaBA+V3,aBA+V3+V4 between aBA+V3
and aBA + V3 + V4 is the same as the joint distribution PE′,B between E
′ and B. Similarly, the joint
distribution PaBA,aBA+V3+V4 between aBA and aBA+V3+V4 is the same as the joint distribution PaBA,B
between aBA and B. Thus, we stochastically have the Markovian chain A−◦−E ′−◦−B −◦−B′. Hence, it is
impossible to distill secure keys from A and B′ [71], [72], [51].
To discuss more detail, we assume that Y is subject to a Gaussian distribution with variance vY . For
the analysis under this assumption, we define
H(v)
:=− 1√
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
[
Φ1(
x√
v
) log Φ1(
x√
v
)dx
+ (1− Φ1( x√
v
)) log(1− Φ1( x√
v
))
]
e−x
2/2dx. (39)
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H(v) is strictly increasing for v. Since
H(v1/v2)
=− 1√
2πv2
∫ ∞
−∞
[
Φ1(
x√
v1
) log Φ1(
x√
v1
)dx
+ (1− Φ1( x√
v1
)) log(1− Φ1( x√
v1
))
]
e−x
2/2v2dx, (40)
we have H [PE′, vB|E′] = H
( a2Bb2E
a2
E
+b2
E
+b2B
a2
B
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+vY
)
= H
( αB
αE+1
+1
αBαE
αE+1
+v′
Y
)
and H(B′|A)[PB′,A] = H(vY +b
2
B
a2
B
) = H(
v′
Y
+1
αB
),
where αB :=
a2B
b2
B
, αE :=
a2E
b2
E
, and v′Y :=
vY
b2
B
. Hence, we have the key generation rate (H [PE′, vB|E′] −
H(B′|A)[PB′,A])+ = R1 :=
(
H
( αB
αE+1
+1
αBαE
αE+1
+v′
Y
)
− H(v′Y +1
αB
)
)
+
. This value is strictly positive if and only
if v′Y <
αB
αE+1
, i.e., vY <
a2Bb
2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
because H(v) is strictly increasing for v. Notice that the condition
v′Y < (≥) αBαE+1 , i.e., vY < (≥)
a2Bb
2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
equivalent to the condition of Part (i) ((ii)) of Theorem 6 in this
case.
2) Asymptotic case with estimation: We consider the case when the distribution of PY and the param-
eters aB , aE , vY , bB , bE , and eB are known to Alice and Bob. We assume the asymptotic case, in which
l goes to infinity but l
n
goes to zero. In this case, they estimate these parameters by Steps 1 and 2 pf
Protocol 1. The estimation errors for these parameters go to zero. Also, as discussed in Section VI-C2,
the estimation error for the distribution of PY goes to zero. Therefore, they can achieve the asymptotic
key generation rate H [PE′, vB|E′]−H(B′|A)[PB′,A].
3) Comparison with one-way case: To compare our protocol with the one-way wire-tap channel, we
assume that the distribution of PY and the parameters aB , aE , vY , bB , bE , and eB are known to Alice,
Bob, and Eve. In fact, the following modified protocol can be reduced to the one-way case. In Step 1
of Protocol 2, Alice makes the random variable A′i := sgnAi. Then, we make information reconciliation
(Step 2 of Protocol 2) with the opposite direction (Alice sends the syndrome to Bob via public channel).
This modification is called forward reconciliation. Sending Alice’s syndrome is equivalent to restricting
Alice’s variables to a special coset with respect to C. Hence, the analysis with forward reconciliation can
be reduced to the one-way wire-tap channel. Then, using existing results of wire-tap channel [15], we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 7: (i) When aB
bB
> aE
bE
and there exists a cumulative distribution function F such that the
distribution corresponding to F is not the delta measure and
Φ b2
E
a2
B
a2
E
−b2
B
= FY ∗ F, (41)
there exists a secure wire-tap code for the wire-tap channel (3) and (4).
(ii) Conversely, assume that aB
bB
< aE
bE
or there exists a cumulative distribution function F such that
FY = Φ b2
E
a2
B
a2
E
−b2
B
∗ F, (42)
the wire-tap channel (3) and (4) cannot transmit secure information from Alice to Bob.
Proof. First, we show (i). Let V1 be a random variable such that the cumulative distribution function is
F and it is independent of E ′. Condition (36) guarantees
F ∗ FY+bBX1 = F ∗ (Φb2B ∗ FY ) = Φb2B ∗ (F ∗ FY ) = Φb2B ∗ Φ b2Ea2B
a2
E
−b2
B
= Φ b2
E
a2
B
a2
E
,
which implies that the variable Y + bBX1 + V1 is subject to the same distribution as
bEaB
aE
X2. Therefore,
the channel from A to aE
aB
(B + V1) has the same conditional distribution as that of the channel from A
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to E. Hence, the channel from Alice to Eve can be regarded as a degraded channel of the channel from
Alice to Bob. Hence, the capacity is given as the maximum of
I(A;B)− I(A;E) = H(A|E)−H(A|B) = H(A|E)−H(A|BE)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
(
H(A|E = e)−
∫ ∞
−∞
H(A|B = b)PB|E=e(db)
)
PE(de) (43)
with respect to the choice of the distribution of A [15], In this case, the conditional distribution PA|B=b
is different from PA|B=b′ when b 6= b′. The assumption for F guarantees that V1 is not a deterministic
value. Hence, the conditional distribution PB|E=e has probability at least two points. Hence, we find that
H(A|E = e)− ∫∞−∞H(A|B = b)PB|E=e(db) > 0. Therefore, the value (43) is strictly positive. Hence, we
obtain the statement (i).
Next, we show (ii). Let V2 be a random variable such that the cumulative distribution function is F
and it is independent of X2. Then, we have
FV2 ∗ F bEaB
aE
X2
= F ∗ Φ b2
E
a2
B
a2
E
= (F ∗ Φ b2
E
a2
B
a2
E
−b2
B
) ∗ Φb2
B
= FY ∗ Φb2
B
which implies that the variable bEaB
aE
X2 + V1 is subject to the same distribution as Y + bBX1. Therefore,
the channel from A to bEaB
aE
E + V2 has the same conditional distribution as that of the channel from A
to B. Hence, the channel from Alice to Bob can be regarded as a degraded channel of the channel from
Alice to Eve. Thus, the wire-tap channel (3) and (4) cannot transmit secure information from Alice to
Bob [15], which is the statement (ii).
Now, we compare the conditions of Part (i) of Theorem 6 and Lemma 7. When
a2Bb
2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
>
b2Ea
2
B
a2
E
− b2B ,
the condition of Part (i) of Theorem 6 is weaker than the condition of Part (i) of Theorem 7. Since
a2Bb
2
E
a2E + b
2
E
−
(b2Ea2B
a2E
− b2B
)
=
b4Eb
2
B
a2E(a
2
E + b
2
E)
(
(
aE
bE
)4 + (
aE
bE
)2 − (aB
bB
)2
)
=
b4Eb
2
B
a2E(a
2
E + b
2
E)
(
α2E + αE − αB
)
,
(44)
this condition is equivalent to
α2E + αE > αB. (45)
Since αE and αB are the ratios between the signal power and the power of detector noise of Eve and
Bob, respectively, it is natural to assume that this ratio of Eve is equal to or larger that that of Bob, which
implies the inequality (45). Hence, when this inequality holds, the condition of Part (i) of Theorem 6 is
weaker than the condition of Part (i) of Lemma 7. That is, our method has a higher possibility to generate
secure keys.
To discuss more details, we assume that Y is subject to a Gaussian distribution with variance vY . Then,
Theorem 6 shows that Alice and Bob can distill secure keys from A and B′ by using our method if and
only if
a2Bb
2
E
a2E + b
2
E
> vY , i.e.,
αB
αE + 1
> v′Y . (46)
Lemma 7 shows that Alice can send secure information to Bob via the one-way protocol based on the
wire-tap channel (3) and (4) if and only if
b2Ea
2
B
a2E
− b2B > vY , i.e.,
αB
αE
− 1 > v′Y . (47)
Therefore, under the natural condition (45), our method has weaker condition to distill secure keys than
the condition for secure communication in the one-way protocol. In fact, in the natural setting, Eve’s ratio
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αE is equal to or larger that Bob’s ratio αB , which implies that the condition (47) does not holds for any
v′Y . However, even under this case, we have a possibility to satisfy the condition (46) for our method.
To discuss the detail, we consider the secure capacity for the wire-tap channel (3) and (4) under
the energy constraint . When Alice the wire-tap channel n times, we denote the set of codewords by
Mn ⊂ Rn. For Mn, we impose the condition
∑n
i=1 x
2
i ≤ n with any sequence (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Mn.
Under this condition, the secure capacity is calculated as [1](1
2
log(1 +
a2B
vY + b2B
)− 1
2
log(1 +
a2E
b2E
)
)
+
=
(1
2
log(1 +
αB
v′Y + 1
)− 1
2
log(1 + αE)
)
+
. (48)
With this rate, the strong security also holds [73, Appendix D-C]. This quantity is strictly positive if and
only if the condition (47) holds.
C. Estimation with confidence level in finite-length case
1) Estimation of parameters: To estimate the average eB , the variance vB , the covariance cAB between
A and B, and the distribution PE′ , we set the confidence level 1− ǫ. Due to the quasi static assumption,
the random variables A, B, and E ′ are is subject to an identical and independent distribution. Since
the distribution of B is unknown, if the number l of samples is not so large, it is not easy to give the
confidence interval for the estimation of eB. However, when the number l is sufficiently large (e.g., more
than 104), it is allowed to apply Gaussian approximation for a given confidence level 1 − ǫ. When the
variance is unknown, we need to employ the t-distribution of degree l − 1. However, since the number l
is sufficiently large, it can be well approximated by the Gaussian distribution. Now, we use the ǫ percent
point Zǫ (the quantile) of the standard Gaussian distribution. The confidence interval of the average eB is
[eˆB −
√
v¯BZǫl
− 1
2 , eˆB +
√
v¯BZǫl
− 1
2 ] by using the sample mean eˆB and the unbiased variance v¯B . However,
due to the largeness of l, the unbiased variance v¯B can be replaced by the sample variance because the
difference is almost negligible.
Next, we estimate the variance vB . When B is subject to the Gaussian distribution, we need to employ
the χ2 distribution of degree l− 1 unless the number l is sufficiently large. Now, we can apply Gaussian
approximation because the number l is sufficiently large. To estimate the variance of (B−eB)2, we define
the estimate w¯B :=
1
l−1
∑l
i=1((B¯i − eˆB)2 − 1l−1
∑l
i=1(B¯j − eˆB)2)2, which approximates the variance of
(B − eB)2. The confidence interval of the variance vB is [v¯B −
√
w¯BZǫl
− 1
2 , v¯B +
√
w¯BZǫl
− 1
2 ].
Now, we estimate the covariance cAB between A and B by using the sample mean cˆAB of A(B− eˆB).
To get the confidence interval of the covariance cAB, we employ the unbiased variance vˆAB of (A −
eˆA)(B− eˆB), which approximates the variance of the sample mean cˆAB . So, the confidence interval of the
covariance cAB is [c¯AB −
√
v¯ABZǫl
− 1
2 , c¯AB +
√
v¯ABZǫl
− 1
2 ], where c¯AB :=
1
l−1
∑l
i=1(A¯i − eˆA)(B¯i − eˆB).
2) Estimation of distribution: To get the estimate PˆE′ , we define the random variable A¯
c := B −
cˆABA− eˆB . Using the second l data (A˜1, B˜1), . . . , (A˜l, B˜l), we define our estimate
FˆA¯c(x) :=
1
l
l∑
i=1
I[−∞,x](A¯
b
i) (49)
based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [58], [59], where A¯bi := B˜i − cˆABA˜i − eˆB
When
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
≥ b2B , we define our estimate as
FˆE′ := G cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
[FˆA¯c ]. (50)
Otherwise, we define our estimate as FˆE′′ := FˆA¯c . The estimate PˆE′ (PˆE′′) of the distribution PE′ (PE′′)
is given as the derivative of FˆE′ (FˆE′′).
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Now, we evaluate the error of these estimates FˆE′ and FˆE′′ . To estimate the error of this estimator, we
define the Kolmogorov distribution function L(x)[60];
L(x) := 1− 2
∞∑
k=1
(−1)k−1e−2k2x2 =
√
2π
x
∞∑
k=1
e−(2k−1)
2π2/(8x2), (51)
which can also be expressed by the Jacobi theta function ϑ01(z = 0; τ = 2ix
2/π). Then, we have the
following lemma with an integer lǫ,δ, which is defined later for two real numbers ǫ, δ > 0. This lemma
will be shown in Subsection IX-B.
Lemma 8: Under the condition
cˆ2ABa
2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
≥ b2B , the estimate FˆE′ for FE′ satisfies the inequality
sup
x
|FE′(x)− FˆE′(x)|
≤
√
vˆAB√
2πecˆAB
√
l
Zǫ +
1√
l
L−1(1− ǫ) (52)
with confidence level 1 − 2(ǫ+ δ) when l ≥ lǫ,δ. Under the condition cˆ
2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
< b2B , the estimate FˆE′′ for
FE′′ satisfies the inequality
sup
x
|FE′′(x)− FˆE′′(x)|
≤
√
vˆAB√
2πecˆAB
√
l
Zǫ +
1√
l
L−1(1− ǫ) (53)
with confidence level 1− 2(ǫ+ δ) when l ≥ lǫ,δ.
To show define lǫ,δ, we employ Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [58], [59], whose detail is the following. We
consider the independent random variables X¯1, . . . , X¯l subject to the distribution PX , whose cumulative
distribution function is FX(x). Then, we define the empirical distribution function
FX,l(x) :=
1
l
l∑
i=1
I[−∞,x](X¯i), (54)
where I[−∞,x](X) is the indicator function, equal to 1 if X ≤ x and equal to 0 otherwise. We define the
random variable
DX,l := sup
x
|FX,l(x)− FX(x)|. (55)
Then, we have the following lemma.
Proposition 9 (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test[60]): The equation
lim
l→∞
Pr(DX,l ≤ 1√
l
L−1(1− ǫ)) = 1− ǫ (56)
holds.
For two real numbers ǫ, δ > 0, we define the integer lǫ,δ as
lǫ,δ := min
{
l′
∣∣∣Pr(DX,l ≤ 1√
l
L−1(1− ǫ)) ≤ 1− (ǫ+ δ) for l ≥ l′
}
. (57)
The above Proposition guarantees the finiteness of lǫ,δ. Thus, the estimate FˆA¯c for FA¯c satisfies the relation
sup
x
|FA¯c(x)− FˆA¯c(x)| ≤
1√
l
L−1(1− ǫ) (58)
with confidence level 1− (ǫ+ δ) when l ≥ lǫ,δ.
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D. Security analysis with estimation in finite-length case
In our protocol given in Section V-A, in addition to the choice of hash functions, there are other
random variables that are publicly transmitted. For example, the information for error estimation is publicly
transmitted between Alice and Bob. So, the collection of them are denoted by C, and its distribution is
denoted by PC , which depends on the distribution PY and the parameters aB and eB . In this case, the
length of sacrifice bit length m1 depends on C. So, it is denoted by m1(C). The distribution PH of the
choice of the hash function also depends m1(C). So, it is given by the conditional distribution PH|m1(C).
Since the length of final keys also depends on C, the uniform distribution is given by the conditional
distribution PUni,K|C. Thus, the security criteria (32) and (33) are modified to
I ′(K : E|HC) :=
∑
c,h
PC(c)PH|m1(C)=m1(c)(h)D(PEK|H=h,C=c‖PE|H=h,C=c × PUni,K|C=c) (59)
d(K : E|HC) :=
∑
c,h
PC(c)PH|m1(C)=m1(c)(h)d(PEK|H=h,C=c, PE|H=h,C=c × PUni,K|C=c), (60)
where PUni,K|C=c is the uniform distribution of K with the length determined by C = c.
For given public information C, we define
2φˆ(C,ǫ)(t) :=
{
2φ[PˆE′ ,vB|E′ ](t) + 2(1− 2−t)(
√
vˆAB√
2πelcˆAB
Zǫ +
1√
l
L−1(1− ǫ)) when cˆ2ABa2E
a2
E
+b2
E
≥ b2B
2φ[PˆE′′ ,c
2
AB
](t) + 2(1− 2−t)(
√
vˆAB√
2πelcˆAB
Zǫ +
1√
l
L−1(1− ǫ)) otherwise, (61)
where vB|E′ :=
(cˆAB−
√
vˆAB√
l
Zǫ)2b2E
a2
E
+b2
E
+ b2B and cAB := cˆAB −
√
vˆAB√
l
Zǫ.
Hence, using Proposition 9 (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test[60]), we obtain the following lemma and theo-
rem, which will be shown in Subsection IX-C.
Lemma 10: The function φˆ(C, ǫ) satisfies the inequality
2φ[PE′ ,vB|E′ ](t) ≤ 2φˆ(C,ǫ)(t) (62)
with confidence level 1− 2(ǫ+ δ) when l ≥ lǫ,δ.
Combining Lemmas 5 and 10 with Theorem 1 and (17), we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 11: The function φˆ(C, ǫ) satisfies the inequality
I ′(K : E|HC) ≤ inf
s∈(0,1)
1
s
2s(n−m1)+nφˆ(C,ǫ)(s), (63)
d(K : E|HC) ≤3 min
s∈[0, 1
2
]
2s(n−m1)+nφˆ(C,ǫ)(s), (64)
with confidence level 1− 2(ǫ+ δ) when l ≥ lǫ,δ.
When we focus on the security criterion I ′(K : E|HC), by using Theorem 11, given a security level κ
and the observed values, the sacrifice bit length m1 is chosen as
argmin
{
m1
∣∣∣∣ infs∈(0,1) 1s2s(n−m1)+nφˆ(C,ǫ)(s) ≤ κ
}
. (65)
When we focus on the other security criterion d(K : E|HC), the sacrifice bit length m1 is chosen as
argmin
{
m1
∣∣∣∣3 min
s∈[0, 1
2
]
2s(n−m1)+nφˆ(C,ǫ)(s) ≤ κ
}
. (66)
That is, when we choose the sacrifice bit length m1 based on (65) or (66), the leaked information is less
than κ with confidence level 1− 2(ǫ+ δ) when l ≥ lǫ,δ.
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E. Typical case
To treat our model more concretely, in the following typical case, we consider the key generation rate
when the sacrifice bit length is decided by the formulas (65) and (66). In this subsection, for simplicity,
we discuss only the case when Y is a Gaussian random variable and eB = eˆB = 0 while the employed
formulas (65) and (66) do not assume that Y is a Gaussian random variable. First, we assume that there
is no error between the true values and our estimations. That is, eˆB = eB , cˆAB = aB , vˆB = a
2
B + vB + b
2
B ,
and PˆAc = PAc . By using the probability density function ϕ of the standard Gaussian variable and the
correlation coefficient, the quantity H [PE¯, vB|E′] can be written to be H [ϕ,
1−ρ2E
ρ2
E
] because
1−ρ2E
ρ2
E
=
vB|E′
vE′
.
So, the required sacrifice bit rate is 1−H [ϕ, 1−ρ2E
ρ2
E
], which is mutual information between E ′ and B′. On
the other hand, the mutual information I(PˆAc, cˆAB) between A and B
′ is calculated to be 1−H [1−ρ2A
ρ2
A
]. That
is, the secure key generation rate is H [ϕ,
1−ρ2
E
ρ2
E
]−H [ϕ, 1−ρ2A
ρ2
A
] under the reverse information reconciliation.
Now, we consider the following special case. Eve’s detector has the same performance as Bob’ detector,
i.e., bE = bB , which will be denoted by b. The coefficients aB and aE for attenuations equals the same
value
√
2b. By using the variance of the noise Y , the correlation coefficients ρA and ρE are calculated
as ρ2A =
2
3+
vY
b2
and ρ2E =
4+
3vY
b2
9+
3vY
b2
, i.e.,
1−ρ2
A
ρ2
A
=
1+
vY
b2
2
and
1−ρ2
E
ρ2
E
= 5
4+
3vY
b2
. If the noise Y generated in
the transmission is not zero, the mutual information between A and E is larger than that between A
and B. So, the forward information reconciliation cannot generate any keys. However, when we employ
the reverse information reconciliation, there is a possibility to generate secure keys. When vY <
2b2
3
,
we have ρ2A > ρ
2
E , i.e., the secure key generation rate is the positive value H [ϕ,
5
4+
3vY
b2
] − H [ϕ, 1+
vY
b2
2
]
under the reverse information reconciliation, which is numerically calculated as Fig. 2. In particular, when
vY =
b2
5
, the secure key generation rate H [ϕ, 5
4+
3vY
b2
]−H [ϕ, 1+
vY
b2
2
] is 0.108, and the mutual informations
1 − H [ϕ, 1+
vY
b2
2
] and 1 − H [ϕ, 5
4+
3vY
b2
] are 0.372 and 0.264. In this special case, the coding rate of error
correcting code needs to be less than 0.372, and the sacrifice bit rate needs to be greater than and 0.264.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
vY
b
2
0.05
0.10
0.15
Key generation rate
Fig. 2. Key generation rate
However, when we care about the finiteness of the block length of our code, the amount of leaked
information of our final keys is not zero even though the key generation rate is less than H [ϕ, 5
4+
3vY
b2
]−
H [ϕ,
1+
vY
b2
2
]. To discuss this issue, we need to care about estimation error. In the following, we assume
the same assumption as the above discussion except for the relation between the true values and our
estimations. For this purpose, we briefly discuss the upper bounds (63) and (64) by taking account into
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estimation error. To keep a high precision, we set the confidence level to be 1− 10−4, i.e., ǫ = 5× 10−5.
So, Zǫ = 4.06 and L
−1(1− ǫ) = 2.30 [61]. For example, we employ block length n = 1, 000, 000. So, it
is natural to choose the number of sampling to be the same value1, 000, 000, i.e., l = 500, 000. In graph
3, we numerically calculate the logarithm s(n−m1) + nφˆ(C, ǫ)(s) + log 3 of the upper bounds appeared
in and (64) as a function of s when vY =
b2
5
and the sacrifice bit length m1 is 0.30 × 1, 000, 000 =
300, 000. The minimum value is −867 and is realized when s = 0.07. That is, when the required security
level κ is chosen to be 2−867, the sacrifice bit length given in (66) is 300, 000. Here, the logarithm
s(n−m1) + nφˆ(C, ǫ)(s)− log s of the upper bounds appeared in (63) has almost the same behavior as
that in (64).
In this numerical calculation, we need the value vˆAB. When Y is a Gaussian random variable, the
expectation of vˆAB is 2c
2
AB+ vB, which equals 2a
2
B+(a
2
B+ b
2
B+ vY ) = 7b
2+ vY . Notice that the variance
of A is 1. Also,
vB|E′
vE′
is (
(
√
2−
√
vˆAB
b
√
l
Zǫ)2
3
+ 1)/(4
3
+ vY
b2
) = (
(
√
2−
√
7+
vY
b2√
l
Zǫ)2
3
+ 1)/(4
3
+ vY
b2
).
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
s
10000
20000
30000
40000
Leaked Information
Fig. 3. Logarithm of upper bound of leaked information
VII. EXTENSIONS
A. Multi-antenna attack
As a more powerful Eve, we assume that, instead of (4), Eve can prepare k antennas that receiving Ej
(j = 1, . . . , k) under Assumptions (A1)-(A6) as
Ej = aE,jA + bE,jX2,j. (67)
Bob receives B given in (3), and X2,i are subject to the standard Gaussian distribution independently of
other random variables Xi (i = 1, 2).
That is, Eve knows E1, . . . , Ek as well as Y . Now, we convert the random variables E1, . . . , Ek to
the random variable E :=
∑k
j=1
Ej
aE,j
= kA +
∑k
j=1
bE,j
aE,j
X2,j and its orthogonal complements Eˆj (j =
1, . . . , k − 1). The orthogonal complements Eˆj are orthogonal to B as well as to E. Thus, all of Eve’s
information for B are converted to the pair of E and Y . Therefore, we can apply Theorem 1. Notice that∑k
j=1
bE,j
aE,j
X2,j is a random variable whose variance is
∑k
j=1(
bE,j
aE,j
)2.
When all of aE,j and all of bE,j are the same values aE and bE , E can be written as kA +
bE
aE
√
kX2
by using another standard Gaussian variable X2. That is, E has the same information as aEA +
bE√
k
X2.
We can apply the above analysis with replacement of bE by
bE√
k
. Hence, even when there is a possibility
that Eve prepares plural antennas, when Alice and Bob set the constant bE to be a sufficiently small
number, they can prevent the multi-antenna attack. When Eve prepares infinitely many antennas, Alice
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and Bob cannot disable Eve to access their secret information. However, considering the constraint for
Eve’s budget, Alice and Bob can assume a reasonable value for the constant bE .
B. Complex number case
In the real wireless communication, all of number numbers are given as complex numbers. In this
case, the random variables A, Xj , and Y are given as AR + iAI , Xj,R + iXj,I , and YR + iYI , where the
random variables AR, AI , Xj,R and Xj,I are independently subject to the standard Gaussian distribution.
and YR and YI are independently of other random variables. So, the noise injecting attack model with
Assumptions (A1)-(A6) can be written as
B = aBe
iθBA+ eiθY Y + bBe
iθ1X1 + eBe
iθ3 (68)
E = aEe
iθEA+ bEe
iθ2X2, (69)
where aB, aE, bB , and bE are positive real numbers. Now, we choose BR and BI (ER and EI) to be the
real and imaginary parts of e−iθBB (e−iθEE), respectively. We introduce the new random numbers X ′1,R
and X ′1,I as the real and imaginary parts of e
i(θ1−θB)X1, and X ′2,R and X
′
2,I as those of e
i(θ2−θE)X2. In
the same way, we introduce Y ′R and Y
′
I as the real and imaginary parts of e
i(θY −θB)Y .
Then, these random numbers are also independently subject to the standard Gaussian distribution. Thus,
the noise injecting attack model with real random variables can be applied as
BR = aBAR + bBY
′
R + bBX
′
1,R + eB cos(θ4 − θE) (70)
BI = aBAI + bBY
′
I + bBX
′
1,I + eB sin(θ4 − θE) (71)
ER = aEAR + bEX
′
2,R (72)
EI = aEAI + bEX
′
2,I . (73)
VIII. INTERFERENCE MODEL
In this section, to understand the model of this paper, we discuss another model, in which, Eve is
weaker than Eve of the present model. we consider a different situation as a preparation for our analysis
of noise injecting attack. That is, we replace Assumption (A1) by the following assumption (A1)’, and
keep the quasi static assumption (Assumption (A4)) for both channels.
(A1)’ Bob’s and Eve’s detections B and E˜ are written by using Alice’s signal A as
B := aBA + Y + bBX1 + eB, (74)
E˜ := aEA + Y2 + bEX2, (75)
where the random variables Xj are subject to the standard Gaussian distribution independently
and aB, bB , eB , aE , bE , bE are constants during the coherent time, i.e., they can be regarded for
one block length for our code. The remaining random variables Y and Y2 are independent of
Xj .
Due to the quasi static assumption (Assumption (A4)) for both channels, the variables X1, X2, Y , and
Y2 are independent in each transmission. Eve is not allowed to know the value of Y and Y2, but she
knows their distribution. Hence, Assumption (A6) is replaced by the following.
(A6)’ Eve knows all the channel parameters, which are given in (74) and (75). Also, she knows the
forms of the distributions of Y and Y2.
Since there is no assumption for the relation between Y and Y2, this model contains the case with
interference. Under this model, the second terms express the noise during transmission over the space
between Alice and Bob, and the third terms express thermal noises in the individual detectors due to the
local Gaussian noise assumption (Assumption (A2)), whose sizes are reflected in the constants bE , and
bE .
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As discussed in Section IV, when Eve is closer to Alice than Bob and the performance of Eve’s detector
is the same as that of Bob’s, secure communication with forward reconciliation is impossible. Since there
is a possibility of secure communication with backward reconciliation, this section also discusses this type
of secure key generation. Hence, we consider the same protocol with backward reconciliation, as given
in Section V.
Under Assumptions (A1)’, (A2)-(A5), (A6)’, Alice and Bob can estimate the coefficients aB , bB , eB ,
aE , and bE in the same way as in the model discussed above. Also, they can estimate the distribution of
Y . However, it is impossible for them to estimate the distribution of Y2, i.e., type of interference during
transmission. To evaluate the security of this case, we focus on the Markov chain
B −◦− (Y,E)−◦− (Y2, E)−◦− E˜. (76)
Hence, Eve of this model is not stronger than Eve in Section II. Therefore, it is sufficient to evaluate the
information leakage to Eve in Section II. That is, the security evaluation in Section VI is sufficient for
the model of this section.
In fact, when Y2 =
a2E+b
2
E
aBaE
Y , we have E ′ = aBaE
a2
E
+b2
E
E˜. Due to Theorem 1, Eve’s performance of this
model equals that of the model in Section II. Therefore, Eve of this model is sufficiently strong under
this special interference. This kind of characterization is based on the local Gaussian noise assumption.
Bob
Alice
common noise  
Eve
1Bb X+
2Eb X+
Y
A B
a A
Ea A
Y+
cY+
Fig. 4. Interference model: This figure shows the case when Eve has the same interference as that in Bob’s detection.
IX. PROOFS
A. Proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5
We introduce Gallager function
E0(t|PB′|X , PB′) :=log
∫ ∞
−∞
(
∑
b′
PB′(b)PX|B′(x|b′)
1
1−t )1−tdx,
which is known to be convex for t [57]. Since 2φ[PE′ ,v](t) = 2E0(s|PB′|X ,PB′)((1
2
)1−
1
1−t )1−t, we have φ[PE′, v](t) =
E0(t|PB′|X , PB′) + t, which shows that φ[PE′, v](t) is convex for t. Hence, we obtain Lemma 4.
Now, we show Lemma 5, i.e., (34) and (35). For this purpose, we introduce a function for a joint distri-
bution PX,Y as φ(t|X|Y |PX,Y ) :=
∫
Y(
∑
x PX,Y (x, y)
1
1−t )1−tdy, which is denoted by −tH↑1
1−t
(X|Y |PX,Y )
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in [40] or −tHG1
1−t
(X|Y |PX,Y ) in [41]. In this proof, we employ the rates R1 := dimCn and R2 := m1n . The
function φ(t|X|Y |PX,Y ) is a generalization of φ[PE′, v](t). Applying [38, (67)] and [41, (21)], we have
d(K : E|H)
(a)
≤3 min
t∈[0, 1
2
]
2tn(R1−R2)+φ(t|B
′n|[B′n],En|PB′n,En)
(b)
≤3 min
t∈[0, 1
2
]
2tn(R1−R2)+tn(1−R1)2φ(t|B
′n,[B′n]|En|PB′n,En)
=3 min
t∈[0, 1
2
]
2tn(1−R2)2nφ(t|B
′|E|PB′,E)
=3 min
t∈[0, 1
2
]
2tn(1−R2)2nφ[PE′ ,v](t), (77)
where (a) and (b) follow from [38, (67)] and [41, (21)], respectively. So, we obtain (35). When we replace
the role of [38, (67)] by [40, (54) and Lemma 22], we obtain a similar evaluation as (35) for ǫ-almost
universal dual hash function.
Now, we introduce another function for PX,Y as
H1+s(X|Y |PX,Y ) :=−1
s
log
∫
Y
(
∑
x
PX|Y (x|y)1+s)PY (y)dy.
We denote sH1+s(X|Y |PX,Y ) by H˜1+s(X|Y |PX,Y ) in [39] or sH↓1+s(X|Y |PX,Y ) in [40]. Applying [39,
(3)], [40, Lemma 5], and [41, (21)], we have
I ′(K : E|H)
(a)
≤ inf
s∈(0,1)
1
s
2sn(R1−R2)−sH1+s(B
′n|[B′n],En|PB′n,En)
(b)
≤ inf
s∈(0,1)
1
s
2sn(R1−R2)+sn(1−R1)2φ(s|B
′n,[B′n]|En|PB′n,En)
(c)
≤ inf
s∈(0,1)
1
s
2sn(R1−R2)+sn(1−R1)2φ(s|B
′n,[B′n]|En|PB′n,En)
= inf
s∈(0,1)
1
s
2sn(1−R2)2nφ(s|B
′|E|PB′,E)
= inf
s∈(0,1)
1
s
2sn(1−R2)2nφ[PE′ ,v](s), (78)
where (a), (b), and (c) follow from [39, (3)], [40, Lemma 5], and [41, (21)], respectively. So, we obtain
(34). When we need an evaluation with ǫ-almost universal dual hash function, it is sufficient to replace
the role of [39, (3)] by [40, (56) and Theorem 23].
B. Proof of Lemma 8
Next, we prepare the following two lemmas
Lemma 12: When a distribution function F1 is differentiable, three distribution functions F1, F2, and
F3 satisfy
sup
x
|F1 ∗ F2(x)− F1 ∗ F3(x)| ≤ sup
x
|F2(x)− F3(x)|. (79)
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Proof. Since
∫∞
−∞
dF1
dx
(x− y)dy = ∫∞−∞ dF1dx (y′ − x)dy′ = 1 with y′ = y, we have
sup
x
|F1 ∗ F2(x)− F1 ∗ F3(x)| = sup
x
|
∫ ∞
−∞
dF1
dx
(x− y)(F2(y)− F3(y)dy|
≤ sup
x
∫ ∞
−∞
dF1
dx
(x− y)(sup
y′
|F2(y′)− F3(y′)|)dy = sup
x
∫ ∞
−∞
dF1
dx
(x− y)dy(sup
y′
|F2(y′)− F3(y′)|)
= sup
y′
|F2(y′)− F3(y′)|.
Lemma 13: When a < 1,
sup
x
|Φ1(x)− Φa(x)| =
∫ √ 2 log a
1−a2
a
√
2 log a
1−a2
1√
2π
e−
x2
2 dx. (80)
When a ≥ 1,
sup
x
|Φ1(x)− Φa(x)| =
∫ a√ 2 log a
1−a2√
2 log a
1−a2
1√
2π
e−
x2
2 dx. (81)
When a is close to 1,
sup
x
|Φ1(x)− Φa(x)| = |a− 1|√
2πe
+O((a− 1)2). (82)
Proof. The derivative of Φ1(x) − Φa(x) with respect to x is 1√2π (e−
x2
2 − 1
a
e−
x2
2a2 ). It equals zero if and
only if x = ±a
√
−2 log a
1−a2 . Due to the symmetry Φ1(x)− Φa(x) = −Φ1(−x)− Φa(−x), the maximum of
the absolute value |Φ1(x)− Φa(x)| is realized when x = ±a
√
−2 log a
1−a2 . Substituting this value, we obtain
(80) and (81).
When a is close to 1, −2 log a
1−a2 =
−2 log(1+a−1)
1−a2 =
−2((a−1)+O((a−1)2))
1−a2 =
2
a+1
+ O(a− 1) = 1 + O(a− 1).
So, we have e−
−2 log a
1−a2
2 = e−
1
2 + O(a − 1), e−
−2a log a
1−a2
2 = e−
1
2 + O(a − 1), and
√
−2 log a
1−a2 − a
√
−2 log a
1−a2 =
(1− a) +O((a− 1)2). Thus,∫ √ 2 log a
1−a2
a
√
2 log a
1−a2
1√
2π
e−
x2
2 dx = |(a− 1) +O((a− 1)2)| · 1√
2π
(e−
1
2 +O(a− 1)) = |a− 1|√
2πe
+O((a− 1)2),
(83)
which implies (82).
Now, we show (52) under the condition
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
≤ b2B . We notice that
sup
x
∣∣∣FE′(x)− FˆE′(x)∣∣∣
≤ sup
x
∣∣∣FE′(x)− Φ√
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
∗ FA¯c(x)
∣∣∣
+ sup
x
∣∣∣Φ√
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
∗ FA¯c(x)− FˆE′(x)
∣∣∣. (84)
M. HAYASHI: SECURE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION UNDER SPATIAL AND LOCAL GAUSSIAN NOISE ASSUMPTIONS 27
We discuss the first term. Since
Φ√
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
∗ FA¯c(x) = Φ√ cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
∗ FB−cˆABA−eˆB(x)
=Φ√
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
∗ FY+bBX1+aBA+eB−cˆABA−eˆB(x) = Φ√ cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
∗ FbBX1+(aB−cˆAB)A+Y+eB−eˆB(x)
=Φ√
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
∗ (Φ√
b2
B
+(aB−cˆAB)2 ∗ FY+eB−eˆB)(x) = Φ√ cˆ2ABa2E
a2
E
+b2
E
+(aB−cˆAB)2
∗ FY+eB−eˆB(x), (85)
we have
sup
x
∣∣∣FE′(x)− Φ√
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
∗ FA¯c(x)
∣∣∣
= sup
x
∣∣∣Φ aBaE√
a2
E
+b2
E
∗ FY+eB−eˆB(x)− Φ√ cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+(aB−cˆAB)2
∗ FY+eB−eˆB(x)
∣∣∣
(a)
≤ sup
x
∣∣∣Φ aBaE√
a2
E
+b2
E
(x)− Φ√
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+(aB−cˆAB)2
(x)
∣∣∣
(b)
=
1√
2πe
∣∣∣ cˆAB
aB
− 1
∣∣∣2 +O(( cˆAB
aB
− 1)2), (86)
where (a) follows from Lemma 12 and (b) does from the combination of (82) and the following derivation;√
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
+ (aB − cˆAB)2
aBaE√
a2
E
+b2
E
=
√
cˆ2AB
a2B
+
a2E + b
2
E
a2E
(1− cˆAB
aB
)2
=
cˆAB
aB
√
1 +
a2E + b
2
E
a2E
(
aB
cˆAB
− 1)2
=
cˆAB
aB
(1 +
a2E + b
2
E
2a2E
(
aB
cˆAB
− 1)2 +O(( cˆAB
aB
− 1)4))
=
cˆAB
aB
+
a2E + b
2
E
2a2E
cˆAB
aB
(
aB
cˆAB
− 1)2 +O(( cˆAB
aB
− 1)4)
=
cˆAB
aB
+O((
cˆAB
aB
− 1)2). (87)
When l ≥ lǫ,δ, with confidence level 1− (ǫ+ δ), since the relation | cˆABaB − 1| ≤
√
vˆAB
cˆAB
√
l
Zǫ holds, the first
term is upper bounded by 1√
2πe
·
√
vˆAB
cˆAB
√
l
Zǫ.
The second term is evaluated as
sup
x
∣∣∣Φ√
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
∗ FA¯c(x)− FˆE′(x)
∣∣∣
=sup
x
∣∣∣Φ√
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
∗ FA¯c(x)− Φ√ cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
−b2
B
∗ FˆA¯c(x)
∣∣∣
(a)
≤ sup
x
|FA¯c(x)− FˆA¯c(x)|, (88)
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where (a) follows from Lemma 12. So, when l ≥ lǫ,δ, the second term is upper bounded by 1√lL−1(1− ǫ)
with confidence level 1− (ǫ+ δ).
Combining these two discussion, we obtain (52) with confidence level 1− 2(ǫ+ δ). Since the relation
| cˆAB
aB
− 1| ≤
√
vˆAB
cˆAB
√
l
Zǫ holds with confidence level 1 − (ǫ + δ) when l ≥ lǫ,δ, combining (58), we obtain
(52).
Now, we show (53). We notice that
sup
x
|FE′′(x)− FˆE′′(x)|
≤ sup
x
|FE′′(x)− FA¯c(x)|
+ sup
x
|FA¯c(x)− FˆA¯c(x)|. (89)
Since
FE′′ = FE′′+eB−eˆB = FAc+eB−eˆB = FB−aBA−eB+eB−eˆB = FB−aBA−eˆB = ΦaB ∗ FB−eˆB (90)
and
FA¯c = FB−cˆABA−eˆB = ΦcˆAB ∗ FB−eˆB , (91)
the first term is evaluated as
sup
x
|FE′′(x)− FA¯c(x)| = sup
x
|ΦaB ∗ FB−eˆB(x)− ΦcˆAB ∗ FB−eˆB (x)|
(a)
≤ sup
x
|ΦaB(x)− ΦcˆAB(x)|
(b)
=
1√
2πe
∣∣∣ cˆAB
aB
− 1
∣∣∣2 +O(( cˆAB
aB
− 1)2), (92)
where (a) and (b) follow from Lemma 12 and (82), respectively. Thus, in the same way, we obtain (53).
C. Proof of Lemma 10
To show Lemma 10, we prepare the following lemmas.
Lemma 14: The function v 7→ (Φ1( x√v )
1
1−t + (1− Φ1( x√v ))
1
1−t )1−t is monotone decreasing for any x.
Proof. The function p 7→ p
1
1−t
+(1−p) 11−t is monotone decreasing in [0, 1
2
] and is monotone increasing in
[1
2
, 1]. The function v 7→ Φ1( x√v ) is monotone increasing in [0, 1] for x > 0 and is monotone decreasing in
[0, 1] for x < 0. Since Φ1(
1√
v
0) = 1
2
, we conclude that the function v 7→ (Φ1( x√v )
1
1−t + (1− Φ1( x√v ))
1
1−t )
is monotone increasing for any x.
Lemma 15: When a non-negative valued function f is monotone decreasing in (−∞, 0] and is monotone
increasing in [0,∞), we have
|
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)PX(dx)−
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)PX′(dx)|
≤2 sup
x
(f(x)− f(0)) sup
x
|FX(x)− FX′(x)|. (93)
Lemma 15 will be shown in Subsection IX-D.
When l is sufficiently large, Lemma 8 and its proof guarantee (52) and | cˆAB
aB
− 1| ≤
√
vˆAB
cˆAB
√
l
Zǫ with
confidence level almost 1 − 2ǫ. In the following discussion, we give a statement with confidence level
almost 1− 2ǫ. Thus, Lemma 14 guarantees that
2φ[PE′ ,vB|E′ ](t) ≤ 2φ[PE′ ,vB|E′ ](t) (94)
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Now, we apply Lemma 15 to the case when f(x) = (Φ( x
vB|E′
)
1
1−t +(1−Φ( x
vB|E′
))
1
1−t )1−t, which satisfies
the condition of Lemma 15. The supremum supx(f(x)− f(0)) is calculated as
sup
x
(f(x)− f(0)) = 1−
( 2
2
1
1−t
)1−t
= 1− 2−t. (95)
Thus, we have
|2φ[PE′ ,vB|E′ ](t)− 2φ[PˆE′ ,vB|E′ ](t)|
≤2 sup
x
(f(x)− f(0)) sup
x
|FE′(x)− FˆE′(x)| = 2(1− 2−t) sup
x
|FE′(x)− FˆE′(x)|
≤2(1− 2−t)
( √vˆAB√
2πecˆAB
√
l
Zǫ +
1√
l
L−1(1− ǫ)
)
. (96)
So, combining (95) and (96), we obtain (62) when
cˆ2ABa
2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
≥ b2B .
Using the same discussion of the proof of the above case and the Markovian chain B −◦− E ′′ −◦− E ′
shown as (17), we can show (62) when
cˆ2
AB
a2
E
a2
E
+b2
E
< b2B .
D. Proof of Lemma 15
To show Lemma 15, we prepare the following lemma.
Lemma 16: Let f be a continuous function defined on [a, b], and G be a bounded function defined on
[a, b]. We assume that G is differentiable except for a finite number of discontinuous points.
(D1) When the function f is monotone decreasing in [a, b] and the function G satisfies
max
y∈[a,b]
(G(y)−G(a)) = G(b)−G(a), (97)
we have ∫ b
a
f(x)
dG
dx
(x)dx ≤ f(a)
∫ b
a
dG
dx
(x)dx. (98)
(D2) When the function f is monotone increasing in [a, b] and the function G satisfies
min
y∈[a,b]
(G(y)−G(a)) = G(b)−G(a), (99)
we have ∫ b
a
f(x)
dG
dx
(x)dx ≤ f(a)
∫ b
a
dG
dx
(x)dx. (100)
(D3) When the function f is monotone increasing in [a, b] and the function G satisfies
max
y∈[a,b]
(G(b)−G(y)) = G(b)−G(a), (101)
we have ∫ b
a
f(x)
dG
dx
(x)dx ≤ f(b)
∫ b
a
dG
dx
(x)dx. (102)
(D4) When the function f is monotone decreasing in [a, b] and the function G satisfies
min
y∈[a,b]
(G(b)−G(y)) = G(b)−G(a), (103)
we have ∫ b
a
f(x)
dG
dx
(x)dx ≤ f(b)
∫ b
a
dG
dx
(x)dx. (104)
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Proof of Lemma 16: We first show Item (D1). We assume that G is C1-continuous. We assume that
there are points a = a1, a2, . . . , a2n = b such that g(x) ≤ 0 for a2i < x < a2i+1 and g(x) ≥ 0 for
a2i+1 < x < a2i+2. So, the assumption of this lemma implies that
∫ a2n−1
a2n−2
g(x)dx+
∫ a2n
a2n−1
g(x)dx ≥ 0. We
choose a point a′2n+1 such that
∫ a2n−1
a2n−2
g(x)dx+
∫ a′2n−1
a2n−1
g(x)dx = 0. We define the function g1 as
g1(x) :=


g(x) for x < a2n−2
0 for a2n−2 ≤ x ≤ a′2n−1
g(x) for a′2n−1 ≤ x.
(105)
Then, we have ∫ b
a
f(x)g(x)dx ≤
∫ b
a
f(x)g1(x)dx. (106)
and g1(x) ≥ 0 for a2n−3 < x < b. Rewriting a2n by a2n−2, we repeat the above process for g1 and denote
the resultant function by g2. Repeating this procedure, we define g1, g2, . . . , gn. So, gn satisfies gn(x) ≥ 0
on (a, b) and ∫ b
a
f(x)g(x)dx ≤
∫ b
a
f(x)gn(x)dx. (107)
Since ∫ b
a
f(x)gn(x)dx ≤ f(a)
∫ b
a
gn(x)dx, (108)
we obtain the desired statement of Item (D1) when G is C1-continuous. In the general case, G can be
approximated by a C1-continuous function satisfying the desired conditions. So, we obtain the desired
statement of Item (D1) in the general case.
Applying −f and −g to Item (D1), we obtain Item (D2). Applying f(a+ b− x) and g(a+ b− x) to
Items (D1) and (D2), we obtain Items (D3) and (D4), respectively.
Proof of Lemma 15: To show (93), it is enough to discuss the case when f(0) = 0 because the general
case can be obtained by substituting f(x)− f(0) into f . Also, it is enough to show that∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)PX(dx)−
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)PX′(dx)
≤2 sup
x
(f(x)− f(0)) sup
x
|FX(x)− FX′(x)|. (109)
We choose
x1 := argmax
x∈(−∞,0]
(FX(x)− FX′(x)) (110)
x2 := argmin
x∈[0,∞)
(FX(x)− FX′(x)). (111)
We choose R sufficiently large.
Items (D1) and (D4) of Lemma 16 imply∫ x1
−R
f(x)PX(dx)−
∫ x1
−R
f(x)PX′(dx) ≤f(−R)[(FX(x1)− FX(−R))− (FX′(x1)− FX′(−R))] (112)∫ 0
x1
f(x)PX(dx)−
∫ 0
x1
f(x)PX′(dx) ≤f(0)[(FX(0)− FX(x1))− (FX′(0)− FX′(x1))] = 0, (113)
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respectively. Similarly, Items (D2) and (D3) of Lemma 16 imply∫ R
x2
f(x)PX(dx)−
∫ R
x2
f(x)PX′(dx) ≤f(R)[(FX(R)− FX(x2))− (FX′(R)− FX′(x2))] (114)∫ x2
0
f(x)PX(dx)−
∫ x2
0
f(x)PX′(dx) ≤f(0)[(FX(x2)− FX(0))− (FX′(x2)− FX′(0))] = 0, (115)
respectively. Combining them, we have∫ R
−R
f(x)PX(dx)−
∫ R
−R
f(x)PX′(dx)
≤f(−R)[(FX(x1)− FX(−R))− (FX′(x1)− FX′(−R))]
+ f(R)[(FX(R)− FX(x2))− (FX′(R)− FX′(x2))]. (116)
Taking the limit R→∞, we have∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)PX(dx)−
∫ ∞
−∞
f(x)PX′(dx)
≤ lim
R→∞
f(−R)[FX(x1)− FX′(x1)] + lim
R→∞
f(R)[FX′(x2)− FX(x2)], (117)
which implies (109).
X. DISCUSSION
We have proposed the noise injecting attack as a very strong attack to secure wireless communication,
in which, Eve can control everything except for the neighborhood of Alice and Bob’s detector. Under a
reasonable assumption (A1)-(A6) for the performance of Eve’s detector, i.e., under the model (1) and (2),
we have constructed a secure key generation protocol by using backward reconciliation over the noise
injecting attack. For this analysis, as Theorem 1, in the noise injecting attack we have shown that Eve’s
information can be reduced to the single random variable E ′ as Theorem 1.
Also, as Lemma 3, when the additive noise generated during the transmission is subject to a Gaussian
distribution, we have derived a necessary and sufficient condition (22) of the coefficients aB aE, and bE
and the variance of its Gaussian random variable for realizing greater correlation coefficient, i.e., greater
mutual information between Alice and Bob than that between Bob and Eve under a spatial condition for
Eve. Even when it is difficult to realize the condition (22), we have proposed the post selection method,
in which, we choose only the case when the condition (22) holds by utilizing the stochastic behavior of
the LHS of (22).
To identify the channel between Alice and Bob, our protocol contains the estimation of channel. In
particular, we do not assume that the additive noise generated during transmission is a Gaussian random
variable. So, we need a non-parametric estimation, which has been resolved by Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test [58], [59]. Combining a suitable exponential upper bound for the leaked information and the above
error evaluation, we derived finite-length security analysis as Theorem 11. As Fig 3, we give a numerical
calculation for the upper bound given in (64) in a typical example.
When Eve breaks the quasi static condition, she can change the artificial noise dependently of the
pulse. In this case, if Alice and Bob pre-agree which pulses are used for samples, Eve can insert the
large artificial noise only to the non-sampling pulses so that the condition (22) does not hold in the non-
sampling pulses without detection by Alice and Bob. Then, Eve can succeed in eavesdropping without
detection by Alice and Bob. Currently, we might not have such a technology, however, we cannot deny
such an eavesdropping in future. Fortunately, in our protocol, Alice and Bob do not fix the sampling pulse
priorly, they choose the sample pulse after the transmission from Alice to Bob as the random sampling,
whose security guaranteed by authentication. Then, Eve cannot selectively insert the artificial noise. The
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same effect is utilized in BB84 protocol of quantum key distribution (QKD) [26]. However, the errors in
Bob’s observations is not necessarily subject to an identical and independent distribution.
In the case of QKD, in the early stage of their analysis, they assume that the errors is subject to an
identical and independent distribution. The attack under this condition is called the collective attack in the
QKD [75]. Later, they removed this assumption by using hypergeometric distribution [63], [64] because
the behavior of this random sampling in the discrete variables case can be discussed by hypergeometric
distribution. However, since our system employs the continuous variable, this type evaluation is not so
easy. Therefore, removing this assumption in our case is beyond the focus of this paper and is an interesting
future problem.
Section VI-E made numerical calculations only when Y is subject to the Gaussian distribution. In
a practice, there is a possibility that Y does not obey the Gaussian distribution. Hence, it is another
interesting future study to make numerical calculations for another type of distribution for Y like Section
VI-E.
Further, there still exits a possibility that Eve can break the assumptions of our model. Such a possibility
might be realized in the following two cases. (i) Eve can concentrate her resource to break the assumptions.
If Eve prepares a very expensive measurement device or too many expensive measurement devices, the
assumptions are broken. (ii) Eve luckily gets a very large value of aE due to the interference effect.
To resolve this problem, the forthcoming paper [70] proposes to combine secure network coding [65],
[66], [67], [68], [69] and secure wireless communication. That is, we consider secure network coding
whose communications on the edges are realized by our secure wireless communication. In this case, for
an eavesdropping, Eve has to break the assumptions of our model in multiple wireless communication
channels. For the case (i), Eve has to distribute her devices in these communication channels. This
combination increases the difficulty of the eavesdropping. For the case (ii), Eve needs to be lucky in
multiple wireless communication channels. Usually, the event of a large value aE might be regarded to be
independent of the same event with the different point. Hence, the above possibility becomes very small.
Therefore, we can decrease the possibility that Eve makes eavesdropping by combining secure network
coding with our result.
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